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Abstract 
 
The paper analyses the role of Port Authorities as cluster managers able to generate resources for 
investments with benefits for the intermodal transport chain as a whole. Assessment is made of Port 
Authority initiatives to foster the development of intermodality and the creation of dry ports. The 
framework proposed is then applied to the case of the Ligurian ports, which compete less as individual 
structures than as nodal points within integrated logistic chains. We argue that the integration of the land 
logistic interface may prove beneficial to the Ligurian ports, and that this can be achieved only if the Port 
Authorities act as cluster managers. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The inland leg is becoming ever more crucial in an increasingly globalised world in 
which competition among ports no longer takes place solely at the level of the services 
supplied and the handling speed of goods within the port area. For it also, and above all, 
depends on the frequency and reliability of connections with the hinterland which 
enable the express forwarding of goods to their destinations. It is particularly important 
to consider the logic whereby the advantages deriving from geographic localization are 
flanked by the quality, availability and functionality of the logistic services offered by 
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the port of call. Important contributions to the study and understanding of this topic 
include Notteboom (1997), and Notteboom and Winkelmans (2001), who argue that 
geographical conditions do not completely explain port performance because other 
factors such as hinterland connections, terminal productivity, and a port’s reputation are 
of key importance as well. As a consequence, competition takes place not only among 
single companies but also among entire supply chains (Harrison and Van Hoek, 2002). 
The rapidly expanding volume of global trade has been driven by the innovation 
introduced by containerization, which has led to evolution of the supply chain (Levison, 
2006). In fact, containerized traffic is undergoing high growth rates which are not 
expected to fall in the near future. Moreover, significant operations of concentration and 
horizontal integration have occurred in the sector, bringing about even more pronounced 
growth in the containerized transport market. This, in its turn, has strengthened the role 
of technology and increased investments in fleets (Beckers, 2006; De Monie, 2006; 
Penfold, 2006). In this context, shipping companies have begun to seek economies of 
scale by increasing the average size of their vessels (Cullinane and Khanna, 2001). In 
fact, in 2001 ships delivered and utilized on the Europe-Asia route had an average 
capacity of 5,000 TEU, while by 2006 this value had grown to 7,000 TEU. From  a 
financial viewpoint, a 12,500 TEU vessel permits a saving at sea of some 29% 
compared with a 6,500 TEU vessel (Cazzaniga Francesetti, 2005). 
 
Figure 1: Liner shipping development and outcomes. 
 
All these trends have also had repercussions in the port sector. As argued by Jansson 
and Schneerson (1987), economies of ship size are enjoyed at sea and diseconomies of 
ship size are suffered in port. As can be seen from figure 1, large vessels and a greater 
use of transshipment compel ports to make greater investments in dredging, dock 
features, information technology, cranes, and superstructures in general. The need to 
have such particular, expensive and standardized facilities has induced direct 
investments in container terminals both by some of the main shipping companies and by 
specialized worldwide terminal operators. Consequently, while the ability to handle 
traffics and port productivity grows, the time that vessels spend in ports decreases, 
which encourages even greater transshipment and the use of even larger ships. 
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Turnaround times (port access, manoeuvre and berthing operations, and the handling 
times of loading and unloading) are constantly improving. All these phenomena are 
enabling ports and terminals to achieve substantial productivity increases, with the 
consequent price reductions (Myung-Shin, 2003). 
This paper focuses on the Ligurian ports, which have become crucial in this period 
due to the expansion of industrial production in the Far East and of trade with Europe, 
so that the Mediterranean has become once again the center of one of the main lines 
(Far East – Europe). 
Ligurian ports are facing important challenges by relying on proposals for financial 
autonomy and the involvement of some of the main global container operators in the 
creation of new infrastructures and facilities. This article proposes a new role for the 
Port Authorities (henceforth PAs), namely as port cluster managers acting to generate 
resources for investments mainly via partnerships and coordination among cluster 
agents (De Langen, 2003). The voluntary investment made by a single port is too often 
smaller than the optimal amount of investments necessary for the entire intermodal 
transport chain (i.e. the optimal investment level for the cluster) where the marginal 
benefits of additional investments are equal to the marginal cost of additional 
investment. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines a simple model of cluster firms 
behavior in which the undercapitalization problem is highlighted. Sections 3 and 4 
describe the governance of Italian ports and the case of the Ligurian ports respectively. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Some simple economics of port clusters 
 
The literature on seaport clusters has been steadily growing over the past years, so 
that we currently have some relevant examples of maritime clusters serving as ideal 
benchmarking for the Ligurian ports analyzed in the present paper. 
De Langen and Visser (2005) propose a comparison between Rotterdam and Lower 
Mississippi seaport clusters. The case of Lower Mississipi shows that collective action 
regimes are less developed in the cluster, compared with the seaport cluster of 
Rotterdam. The lack of leading firms is considered to be one of the main reason for the 
lack of technological innovation. However, although relevant, private firms are not the 
sole determinant of cluster performance. In fact, public bodies are considered to be key 
in coordinating investment and in solving problems of free riding. Rodrigue (2003) 
points out the importance of public sector efficiency to enhance local development 
induced by the activity of New York and New Jersey ports. 
Relevant studies on port clusters include the works by Haezendock (2001) on the 
strengths and weaknesses of Antwerp’s port cluster, Van Klink (1995) on the 
development of port networks, and Slack (1989) on the location behaviour of the port 
service industries. Finally, Lee and Rodrigue (2006) propose an interesting analysis on 
the the effects of trade reorientation on Regional Port Systems in Asia. 
Before presenting our arguments on the Ligurian ports, we propose an admittedly 
very simple model of port cluster, the sole purpose being to highlight the problem of 
suboptimal capital stock due to positive externalities in a cluster. 
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In recent decades the port industry has become even more capital intensive. However, 
as convincingly argued by De Langen (2003), agents operating in a seaport cluster often 
enter into an under-investment situation. The reason is the likely existence of positive 
externalities on capital. In what follows, we sketch some simple economics of port 
clusters in order to clarify certain concepts useful for the analysis of the Ligurian ports. 
Let us consider the problem of a firm interested in maximizing the net benefit from 
capital (k), defined as the difference between benefit (B) and costs (C). This problem 
can be simply formulated as: 
 
(1)     [ ])()(max kCkB
k
−
 
 
The solution to problem (1) is: 
 
(2)     )(')(' pp kCkB =  
 
where kp is the private solution, i.e. the level of capital that a firm would choose if it 
did not consider the presence of externalities. In figure 2, the private solution is 
represented by point A. 
 
Figure 2: The consequences of positive externalities in port clusters. 
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However, integration into the production function of firms operating in a port cluster 
often generates positive capital externalities, as well argued by De Langen (2003). This, 
in turn, implies that problem (1) can be reformulated as: 
 
(3)     [ ])()()(max kCkEkB
k
−+
 
 
where E(k) are positive capital externalities. The solution to (3) is: 
 
(4)     )(')(')(' *** kCkEkB =+  
 
which corresponds to the social optimum in figure 2. It is also clear from figure 2 that 
the presence of positive externalities may lead to a sub-optimal level of capital in the 
cluster, because k*>kp. Therefore PAs should be conceived as cluster managers able to 
coordinate and maximize investments in order to fill the gap between kp and k*. In fact, 
as argued by De Langen (2003), an ideal cluster manager should be characterized by: 
a) incentives to invest with subsequent direct and indirect investment costs 
recovery; 
b) a budget constraint strictly linked to seaport performance; 
c) incentives to participate into public-private partnerships with other stakeholders 
in the cluster; 
d) a commitment to invest only in projects for which coordination failures among 
firms lead to a clear underprovision of the good. 
In order to meet those criteria, the cluster manager should be able to levy a “cluster 
tax (De Langen, 2003), i.e. its costs should be recovered by revenues as a direct or 
indirect function of port performance. 
However, as will become clear in the next section, the governance of Italian ports is 
especially complex, and the role of PAs is very limited, unless a necessary reform on 
PAs financial autonomy is carried out. 
 
 
3. The Governance of Italian ports 
 
In the previous section we showed that a by-product of positive capital externalities is 
a relatively low level of capital stock. In this section, we outline current trends in Italian 
port governance, as well as some reforms currently determining the policy framework. 
At present, Italian PAs act as landlord port authorities: the owner maintains ownership 
over the port, while the infrastructure is leased to private operating companies and 
services management is subcontracted to private terminal operators or service 
companies. This model of port management and the company port model (based on 
complete port privatization in which ownership and service provision are in the hands of 
the private sector) seems able to conjugate public and private interests with the common 
goal of port development (Saundry and Turnbull, 1997). The other two models of port 
governance are the port tool model, in which ownership is public with some port 
operations undertaken by private operators, and the service port model, in which 
ownership and service provision are entirely public (Brooks, 2004). 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 39 (2008): 44-58 
 49
Despite the overall effectiveness of the model adopted in Italy, it has some 
shortcomings which are currently influencing the maritime policy debate. We 
summarize the main issues in figure 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Actors and relations pattern in Italian ports. 
Source: Wiegmans et al. (2002) 
 
The range of possible PA revenues is defined by art.13 of law 84/94, which 
establishes PA financial liabilities. The most important are port duty for the 
embarkation and disembarkation of goods, lease rent for state property ? within the port, 
and some other subsidies from regional and other local agencies. 
The relations between the terminal operator and the shipping company and between 
the terminal operator and the PA concern economic exchanges of services for fares and 
rents (link 1 in figure 3). Shipping companies, instead, pay duties to the PA in relation 
to maritime access and the loading/unloading of goods (link 2). Moreover, almost all the 
taxes and duties paid by shipping companies (above all: port duty for embarkation and 
disembarkation, treasury tax for embarkation and disembarkation, anchorage tax) have 
been collected directly by the PA only since 2007.1 Previously these taxes were 
collected directly by the state and then given in return (and in part) to the PA in order to 
install and maintain the infrastructures guaranteeing access to shipping companies and 
operability to terminal operators (link 3). 
The new system, even if it leaves some taxes in the hands of PAs, is within the 
meaning of a law that allocates? infrastructural works to the state (art.5 law 84/94), 
relieving the PA of this duty. The tax revenues of PAs are in fact lower than those of 
other European ports (Baccelli et al., 2007), and they are not sufficient to finance 
infrastructural works, which are financed by the state, or latterly by public-private 
partnerships. Despite the rapid evolution of the shipping market, PAs are still not able 
fully to meet the demand for port services, mainly because of their inadequate financial 
endowments and their close dependence on government financing policies. The 2007 
Italian Budget Law, however, took some steps towards the financial autonomy of PAs, 
boosting a process that will enable PAs to invest in and develop new infrastructures. 
Giving ports greater financial autonomy may contribute substantially to cost recovery 
                                                 
1
 Art.163, codicil 982, Budget Law 2007 
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through whatever pricing policy? might be deemed appropriate by the ports themselves 
(Haralambides et al., 2001). 
Devolution of the overall maritime fees collected in the ports (under codicil 982, 
Budget Law 2007) is a first and significant step in this direction because it generates 
additional financial resources, mainly coming from maritime traffics. The outcome is a 
doubling of the current tax revenues at the disposal of PAs. In particular, on the basis of 
2005 data, for the three Ligurian ports this law would have meant an increase from 
approximately 15.4 million euros to approximately 52 million euros. Table 1 shows the 
differences between the old and the new fiscal regime2. 
Table 1: Port revenues collected by customs offices of Genoa, La Spezia and Savona. 
Tax revenues 
  
New fiscal regime hipotesis 
 
Collected by the Government   Collected by the Government  
Port duties   Port duties 
 
anchorage tax and surcharge 13,682,047  - - 
50% of port duty and surcharge 
for embarkation and disembark 9,155,464  - - 
100% of Treasury tax for 
embarkation and disembark 12,131,730  - - 
Total (A) 36,016,649 
 - - 
Other taxes   Other taxes  
Duties 573,158,932  Duties 573,158,932 
Other taxes 2,281,709  Other taxes 2,281,709 
VAT (B) 3,327,065,824  VAT (B) 3,327,065,824 
Collected by Port Authories   Collected by Port Authorities  
anchorage tax and surcharge 514,37  anchorage tax and surcharge 13,733,484 
50% of port duty and surcharge 
for embarkation and disembark 9,158,394  
100% of Treasury tax for 
embarkation and disembark 12,131,730 
surcharge for goods 
embarkation and disembark 5,728,225  
100% of port duty and surcharge 
for embarkation and disembark 18,313,858 
Total (C) 15,400,989  Total (C) 51,417,638 
Total (A+B+C) 3,953,924,103  Total (B+C) 3,953,924,103 
Source: Simulations on customs offices data as for 2005. 
 
Moreover, the 2007 Budget Law will have to issue a “decreto attuativo” 
(implementing decree) in order to fix the quota of tax revenues different from taxes and 
from port duties (i.e. VAT and custom duties) to be devolved to each PA for 
infrastructure investment, with the simultaneous abolition of government transfers. This 
codicil 982 has proved to be particularly important, because the total annual tax 
revenues generated in the ports of Savona, Genoa and La Spezia amount to 
approximately 4 billion Euros (table 1). With such an amount, consequently, a few 
                                                 
2
 Note that in our analysis we mainly consider the container market. In doing so, we exclude cruises and 
general cargo, hence we do not consider the possibility of specialization of the ports under consideration. 
We make this choice mainly because of the overwhelming importance of containers in modern economies 
and because Port Authorities development plans (especially the one of Genoa) mainly, although not 
exclusively, consider container terminals development. 
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percentage points of this value would enable PAs to use financial leverage in order to 
undertake major investments.  
To sum up, we have reported that the current system of fiscal devolution in Italy will 
provide PAs with financial resources that may prove beneficial to them when new 
investment is necessary. In the next section we argue that PAs are currently required 
also to act as cluster managers in order to participate in and to coordinate investments. 
 
 
4. The case of Ligurian Port Authorities 
 
As reported in the previous section, the financial capacity of PAs has been improved 
by recent legislation, so that PAs now have the means to undertake some of the 
investment required to support intermodal transport and logistics. However, as in the 
case of the Ligurian ports, the complexity of investments and the large number of 
stakeholders, as well as the fact that Liguria is a multi-port region, necessitate 
substantial coordination among agents. 
As stated in section 2, positive externalities give rise to an under-capitalization of the 
cluster which can be remedied by coordination activity of the PA. In the case of Italy, in 
fact, financial autonomy is not likely to generate resources sufficient to cover all 
investment costs. Hence, PAs are currently forming PPPs in order to raise money 
mainly for logistics centers and inland areas. Involvement in PPPs is certainly only one 
of the ways in which PAs can coordinate investments (i.e. fill the gap between kp and k* 
in figure 2). In what follows we focus on the Ligurian PAs, which have been proven to 
be particularly active in this field (Baccelli et al., 2007). 
Seaports may generally be regarded as gateways through which goods are transferred 
between ships and the shore (Goss, 1990; Jansson and Shneerson, 1982; Van Klink, 
1995). Improving the hinterland access of seaports is, at least partially, an inter-
organisational challenge, because the quality of hinterland access depends on the 
behaviour of a wide variety of actors, such as terminal operators, freight forwarders, 
transport operators, and PAs (De Langen and Chouly, 2004). With these considerations 
in mind, PAs are seeking to promote intermodal transport and logistics through the 
initiatives reported in table 2. These initiatives take mainly the form of agreements 
between railway companies and PAs and partnerships promoting intermodality, but also 
investments in logistic centers or inland areas and company shareholdings. The Ligurian 
PAs are quite active in this sector, and so too are the ports of Trieste, Venice and 
Taranto. 
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Table 2: Synthesis of Port Authorities initiatives for intermodality and logistics promotion. 
Participations in societies 
 
With Railway 
partners 
Establishment 
of a new 
company 
Agreements 
between 
Railway 
companies 
and Port 
Authorities 
Partnership 
in society of 
promotion of 
intermodality 
Investments 
in logistic 
centers or 
inland areas 
Other 
activities 
Ancona   √    
Bari    √   
Carrara     √  
Civitavecchia   √    
Genova   √ √ √  
Gioia Tauro   √    
La Spezia   √ √ √  
Napoli √   √   
Piombino     √  
Ravenna      √ 
Salerno    √   
Savona  √ √ √ √ √ 
Taranto   √ √ √ √ 
Trieste √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Venezia √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Source: Authors’ elaborations on information from newspapers, magazine and direct inquiries as in 
September 2006. 
 
The three Ligurian ports (Genoa, La Spezia and Savona) together account for more 
than 18.5% of overall national traffic (12% of maritime cabotage). Moreover, the 
Ligurian ports handle approximately 65% of Italian containerized traffic (transshipment 
excluded): in 2005 they handled approximately 90 million tons of goods (among which 
42 million tons of general cargo), 2.8 million TEU and 4 million passengers, in 50 
specialized terminals able to serve any type of vessel and good.  
New investments (to improve port capacity) are currently pushing the Ligurian ports 
to improve their inland connectivity. The Ligurian PAs are at the core of an innovative 
process that consists in increasing terminal capacity and in enhancing intermodal 
transport and logistics through investments in railways and intermodal centers 
(figure 4). 
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Figure 4: The role of Port Authorities. 
 
For example, A.P.M. Terminals, which belongs to Maersk Group, plans to establish 
its North Tyrrenian home port at Savona Vado and to build a new container terminal in 
partnership with the Savona Port Authority. The project has already been approved by 
the local and central public administrations and it is included in the Port Master Plan. 
Maersk envisages investing about 100 million Euro in superstructures plus 50 million 
Euro in infrastructural works in this terminal, whilst the Savona Porth Authority is 
expected to invet a further 300 million. The final project was presented in summer 2006 
and work will begin in 2008. This new container terminal will be located in the area of 
Vado Ligure and its capacity should be about 600,000 TEUs.  
MSC has made investments in Genoa’s Calata Bettolo, and the Eurogate Group, 
through its subsidiary Contship, is planning a major expansion of La Spezia’s terminal 
areas. All these initiatives have to undergo a highly complex decisional mechanism for 
their ratification. 
The ports of Genoa, La Spezia and Savona are currently developing railway projects 
(with the hinterland, and from there to Northern Italy and in general to Southern 
Europe) on the assumption that good railway connectivity will enable the Ligurian ports 
to expand their captive area outside national borders. For example, the market for the 
port of Genoa, the most important Italian port for direct calls services, consists almost 
exclusively of national origin/destination traffic (96%) and is concentrated in the 
central-northern Italian regions. The improvement of land accessibility is the focal point 
of a plan that foresees, in the short and medium term, important operations both 
infrastructural and organizational (Autorità Portuale di Genova, 2005). In the past few 
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years the Italian Port Authorities have promoted several initiatives inside and outside 
port walls, the purpose being to encourage intermodality and the development of the 
new logistic value-added services  increasingly necessary to compete on a global level. 
Today, in fact, the development of a modern port requires an efficient network of 
railway connections with inland logistic platforms and with the relative hinterland (Van 
Klink, 1995). In this situation, ports must be efficient, thereby contributing to the 
competitiveness of the entire logistic chain. For these reasons, the Ligurian ports, 
congested due to a lack of space, have had to create stable and effective railway 
connections with the hinterland. They have consequently constructed dry ports just a 
few tens of kilometers from their docks which will represent the basis on which to grow 
and eventually offer additional logistic services (Autorità Portuale di Genova, 2005). 
With a dry port development strategy, the maritime port enlarges its hinterland, 
becomes closer to its customers, helps resolve its problems of saturation, and improves 
its ability to compete, offering direct services to customers and attracting new cargoes 
(UNCTAD, 2004). 
However, the construction of new transport networks serving the port may have 
substantial impacts on organization and on  traffic flows only in the long run. Moreover, 
this period of time may be prolonged both by the physiological? deficiency of public 
financing and by the frequent opposition raised against the construction of new 
infrastructures, which slows down or even interrupts their realization. It is therefore 
necessary to find a rapid solution that allows faster and cheaper transport to and from 
ports. In this regard, however, financial issues may be resolved by upcoming financial 
autonomy,3 but PAs are also supposed to catalyze further private investments, both by 
finding partners and by stimulating the demand to increase investment profitability 
(Sanchez, 2006). 
Table 3 reports the formulation and implementation of strategies to foster 
intermodality in each Ligurian port. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 Italian law, in art.6 codicil 5 of law 84/94 and in codicil 6 of the same article replaced by art.8 bis of 
D.L. 30 December 1997, n.457, converted into law 27 February 1998, n.30, permits port Authorities to 
“costituire ovvero partecipare a società esercenti attività accessorie e strumentali rispetto ai compiti 
istituzionali affidati alle Autorità medesime, anche ai fini della promozione e dello sviluppo 
dell’intermodalità, della logistica e delle reti trasportistiche3”. Moreover, for application of the quoted 
law, reference has been made to D.M. 4 April 1986, according to which the port railway service within 
port borders is part of the services of general interest to be supplied against payment to the port’s users. 
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Table 3: Formulation and realization of strategies in favor of intermodality. 
 
Aim Strategy Realisation 
Development of railway 
traffic to/from port 
Discipline economical and 
operational relations about 
connecting port with national 
railway service 
Signed a protocol agreement 
with Ferrovie dello Stato 
Genoa 
Port 
Authority 
Expand docks and inland 
areas 
Creation of an inland port and 
connections between this and 
the port 
Looking for an area to place 
this site, with Local Agencies 
Improving connections 
between port and S.Stefano 
Magra dry port. 
Construction of railway tracks 
between the two sites 
Participate and rely upon an 
external society for the 
construction of new  
infrastructures 
La Spezia 
Port 
Authority 
Transform S.Stefano Magra in 
inland railway terminal 
Improve dry port facilities Lengthen tracks inside the site 
to allow the creation and 
composition of complete trains 
Integrate port with industrial 
areas in Liguria and Piemonte 
Exploit existent railway lines 
from Savona to Turin and 
Alessandria 
Manage, through a certificate 
subject, railway marshalling 
and traction on two pass lines, 
from port to S.Giuseppe di 
Cairo 
Savona 
Port 
Authority 
Make the railway service 
reliable and frequent 
Purchase some traction 
vehicles to improve railway 
times 
Purchase 6 marshalling 
vehicles and 4 electrical 
locomotives (E645) 
 
The topic of inland logistic platforms, moreover, introduces another problem that has 
always plagued the Ligurian ports system. Port competitiveness nowadays is 
increasingly influenced by the availability of integrated logistic services which require 
broad spaces for the creation of dry ports that expand the territory of reference thanks to 
efficient connections and the supply of specific services. But Liguria has considerable 
difficulties in accommodating this type of infrastructure because of: 
- a lack of suitable spaces and, consequently, their high cost; 
- increasing demand for space by surrounding cities. 
This relative scarcity and/or the high price of space may induce (port) industries to 
move to regions where these inputs are available on more convenient conditions (Musso 
et al. 2000). 
In order to remedy these shortcomings, the Ligurian ports have defined some common 
goals, such as the development of a network of inland logistic platforms beyond the 
Apennines in order to free up spaces in ports (narrow, crowded and expensive) and 
which can be used as buffers for goods coming from ports. In the short run, this network 
could fulfil some of the requirements of ports expansion and the need to improve inland 
connections without increasing road transport. The choice of an inland logistic structure 
will be influenced by infrastructural equipment, transport and logistic services, customs 
and tax conditions. Especial attention must be paid to the gradient of the railway from 
the port to the dry port, which must not be too high, because a service requiring double 
traction – like for example the Savona–San Giuseppe di Cairo route (24 km long, with a 
maximum gradient of 30‰) – involves added costs and has repercussions on the length 
of convoys. 
In this regard, the Italian PAs, and the Ligurian ones in particular, have promoted 
various initiatives, among which: 
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agreements with Trenitalia, RFI, local public agencies, Ministero delle Infrastrutture e 
dei Trasporti, private management railway societies, and logistics centers (“Protocolli 
d’Intesa”); 
- the creation of partnerships among railway companies and among intermodality 
and logistics promotion companies; 
- the purchase of areas dedicated to logistic activities;  
- the purchase of shunting or railway traction vehicles;  
All these aspects can be considered as constituting effective coordination among 
several port stakeholders. To be effective, this coordination must not only be 
commercial but also include cooperation and common initiatives to develop new 
expertise and shared learning processes, and to make investments with cluster benefit 
(De Langen, 2004). The PA is consequently required to provide incentives for 
investments with positive effects on other firms in the cluster. In other words, financial 
autonomy, as well as the need for new and complex investments, are inducing the 
Ligurian PAs to behave like cluster managers. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The paper has argued that the Ligurian ports are facing strong demand pressure 
because of the increase in maritime transport flows in the Mediterranean Sea. Drawing 
on cluster theory, it has shown that the problem of under-capitalization due to positive 
externalities could be solved if the Ligurian Port Authorities acted as cluster managers: 
that is, if they coordinated and catalyzed investment. 
We have shown that the main means by which such coordination can be achieved is 
the creation of public private partnerships. However, it should also be stressed that 
continuous dialogue with all stakeholders in and around the port is crucial. The 
geographical dispersion of economic effects, in fact, in the absence of increasing value 
actions in the territory, may be perceived negatively, because goods passing through 
ports often do not generate significant employment or added value for the local 
communities (Ferrari et al., 2007). This is the main reason why the Italian Ministries of 
Transport, Infrastructure and Finance are discussing how to devise a law that will allow 
the devolution of part of the general taxes (V.A.T. and customs duties) to Port 
Authorities so that they can finance the most important port infrastructure projects. 
In the context of increasing financial autonomy, Port Authorities are now able to act 
as cluster managers, coordinating actors and stimulating cooperation for joint 
investment. According to Musso et al. (2004), the ports of Genoa, La Spezia and Savona 
generate about 2 billion euros of value added and have a global employment impact of 
about 60,000 jobs. In this context, cluster management should be considered as a 
strategic ingredient in enhancing economic development induced by port activity in 
Liguria through a necessary governance of inter-firms and inter-institutional relations. 
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